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This paper investigates the price discovery process in financial markets, with a focus on government
securities markets, by comparing patterns in trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread in the
U.S., Japan, the U.K., Italy, and Canada. The main findings are as follows. 1) In government securities
markets, trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread show U-shaped intraday patterns and
inverse U-shaped intraweek patterns. However, equities and forex markets show different intraday
and/or intraweek patterns, indicating different price discovery processes are in play. 2)  Public
information such as statistical announcements, notification of open market operations, and releases of
policy rate changes affects the price discovery process immediately, creating surges in intraday trading
volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread. The content of this public information, including a
surprise element, is important. It seems that more unexpected the surprise, the larger the surges in
trading volume and price volatility. 3) The speed of price discovery seems to be faster in futures
markets than in cash markets in most of the cases, partly reflecting higher accessibility and faster
order-processing in futures markets. In such cases, it may be concluded that futures markets are deeper
and more liquid than cash markets, in the sense that they quickly reflect incoming information, thus
the degree of information content is high.
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1. Introduction
Prices of a financial product are discovered through trading activities among market participants. This
process by which prices adjust to incorporate new information is referred to as the price discovery
(hereafter PD) process. This paper will explore the similarities and differences, namely stylised facts,
in the PD processes of the five government securities markets (U.S., Japan, U.K., Italy, and Canada)
through examining the behaviour of trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread, primarily
based on existing studies conducted by central bank researchers in these countries.
The motivation to conduct this study is twofold. First, the study has theoretical implications. While
progress in market microstructure theory has established a foothold in understanding market liquidity,
the theory has not yet fully explained the various features of PD processes in markets, particularly, in
fixed income securities markets. Not only central bank researchers, but also academia will benefit
from the perspectives obtained through empirical analysis of whether and how the PD processes are
uniquely related to the nature of the product.
Second, the study has practical implications. Understanding the PD processes themselves may further
increase central banks’ ability to monitor market behaviour. In addition, by observing the processes
around the actual arrival of public information, central banks may gain some insight on the appropriate
timing of their announcements of policy changes and statistics, as well as their notification of open
market operations.
This paper mainly focuses on the government securities markets, because of their familiarity with and
relevance to central banks. It also examines PD processes in the equities and forex markets, in order to
shed light on the differences between PD processes according to product’s different characteristics.
Analyses will be conducted according to the following framework.
(1) Intraday and intraweek patterns
Information is generated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, no financial market is open for such
long hours. In this sense, all market participants face a price risk in not being able to trade at the prices
which reflect the generated information when the market is closed. In addition, there may be some
clustering of important public information at certain times of the day or week, which also affects
trading activity in the market. Presumably, there are some distinct intraday and intraweek patterns of
PD, reflecting market participants’ behaviour in coping with these issues.
(2) PD process after arrival of public information
There must be some type of public information which systematically affects the PD process in
government securities market. The paper analyses the effect of statistical announcements, notification
of open market operations by central banks, and releases of policy rate changes on the PD process, as
examples of such information. Presumably, some unique patterns in trading volume, price volatility,
and bid-ask spread are observed after the arrival of this information.
(3) Interlinkage between the cash and futures markets
If similar products are traded in more than one market, this leads to the question of which market
incorporates new information first. This question regarding PD speed is examined, with a focus on the
relationship between the cash and futures government securities markets. This is based on the
assumption that PD speed is a proxy for market liquidity, i.e., the market is more liquid when PD
speed is high, because the degree of information content is high. Presumably, PD speed depends on
relative accessibility to the two markets.
An outline of the paper’s findings is as follows. 1) In government securities markets, trading volume,
price volatility, and bid-ask spread show U-shaped intraday patterns and inverse U-shaped intraweek
patterns. However, equities and forex markets show different intraday and/or intraweek patterns,2
indicating different PD processes are in play. 2) Public information such as statistical announcements,
notification of open market operations, and releases of policy rate changes immediately affects the PD
process, creating surges in intraday trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread. The content of
this public information, including a surprise element, is important. It seems that more unexpected the
surprise, the larger the surges in trading volume and price volatility. 3) The speed of price discovery
seems to be faster in futures markets than in cash markets in most of the cases, partly reflecting higher
accessibility and faster order-processing in futures markets. In such cases, it may be concluded that
futures markets are deeper and more liquid than cash markets, in the sense that they quickly reflect
incoming information, thus the degree of information content is high.
The composition of this paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly investigates the differences between PD
processes in different financial markets. Section  3 focuses on intraday and intraweek patterns of
trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spreads. Section 4 explores the PD process immediately
after the arrival of public information such as statistical announcements, notification of open market
operations, and announcement of policy rate changes. Section 5 deals with the interlinkage of the cash
and futures government securities markets. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
2. PD process in government securities market
There are legitimate reasons why the PD processes which differ among government securities,
equities, and forex markets, are affected by the relevant type and source of information. There is both
public information and private information. On the one hand, public information, such as
macroeconomic statistics, is released to all market participants simultaneously. In this sense, there is
no information asymmetry. On the other hand, private information, such as a) inside information on an
asset’s fundamental value, and b) information on the order flow and on trading intentions of large
customers, is presumed to be spread gradually to market participants through trading activities.
2.1 Equities vs. government securities
Standard theory on price formation of securities tells us that security prices are determined by the sum
of discounted cash flow. In other words, the prices of securities are determined by two factors:
expected cash flow and discount rate. The greater the cash flow, the higher the security prices would
be. The higher the discount rate, the lower the security prices.
First, how are equity prices determined in relation to the type of information? The expected cash flow
of equities varies according to the future earnings of the company, which are affected by both public
information, such as macroeconomic indicators, and private information, such as company-specific
earnings forecasts. The discount rate applied to equities is variable and is affected by both public and
private information. Given these, an important caveat for equities is that the effect of public
information on cash flow and discount rate often offset each other. For example, as Fleming and
Remolona [1997b] stated, an upward revision of real economic activity would increase not only the
expected cash flow of the company, but also the discount rate. As a result, the combined effect on
equity prices is ambiguous. In sum, it may be concluded that prices of equities are primarily affected
by private information.
On the other hand, in the case of government securities, the expected cash flow of government
securities is fixed.
1 The discount rate applied to government securities is variable, but affected only by
public information. In this sense, one may conclude that the prices of government securities are mainly
affected by public information.
1 Cash flow of index-linked bonds is not fixed, but determined solely by public information, usually the Consumer Price
Index.3
Of course, even in the government securities market, one cannot ignore the effects of a second type of
private information, i.e., information on order flow and on trading intentions of large customers. One
could argue that information asymmetry between dealers and traders could affect the PD process.
However, given the fact that no one has superior insider information on the prices of government
securities, the role of order flow information should be smaller in government securities markets than
in equities markets. In sum, while one should not underestimate the role of order flow information, it
is safe to say that the role of public information is more important in government securities markets
than in equities markets.
Existing studies on the PD process in government securities market seem to be generally consistent
with the above argument. For example, Proudman [1995] writes that some features of the PD process
in the Gilt market are inconsistent with adverse selection models, especially trading volume and
bid-ask spread immediately before and after announcements. Also, Fleming and Remolona [1998]
indicate that market makers are not confronted with the risk of trading with better informed traders at
the time of a major announcement in the government securities market, and market liquidity
surrounding sharp price changes can be examined through inventory control models and not through
asymmetric information models. In the meantime, Scalia and Vacca [1998] emphasise that the role of
private information on the order flow and on the trading intentions of large customers should not be
ignored.
2.2 Forex vs. government securities
In the forex market, public information, more so than private information, seems to be an important
factor in the PD process, because no one has superior inside information.
2 However, the forex market
differs from the government securities market, because relevant information affecting the PD process
comes from two economies, because any forex market by definition has two home markets. This
difference may affect the intraday and intraweek trading patterns, especially when the two economies
are in different time zone.
3. Intraday and intraweek patterns
3
In this section, cross-country comparison is conducted on the intraday and intraweek patterns of
trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread, which reflect the trading needs of market
participants facing a price risk of being unable to trade when the market is closed, as well as public
information arriving in clusters.
3.1 Intraday patterns
It may be worthwhile to briefly review the trade execution mechanisms and the trading hours for the
government securities markets which are analysed below (Table 1). All countries except Japan have
adopted dealer markets, where dealers or market-makers quote bid-ask prices, as their trade execution
mechanism. Japan uses an auction-agency market, where buy and sell orders are continuously matched
in the order-book at the centralised auction-agency. Japan and Italy’s trading hours feature official
opening and closing time, but there are no official opening or closing times for the U.S. and the U.K.
market, although trading seems concentrated during certain periods of the day.
2 Of course, this does not totally exclude the influence of information asymmetry due to private information. In fact, Lyons
[1995] and Ito, Lyons and Melvin [1998] show that information asymmetry does effect the forex market.
3 Analysis of the Canadian market is not included, because no data is available at present.4
Table 1
Government securities markets analysed in this paper
U.S. Japan U.K. Italy
Type of market Interdealer Interdealer Customer Interdealer
Trade execution
mechanism





















Lunch break None 11:00 – 12:30 None None
3.1.1 Observed features in government securities markets
6 (see Graph 1)
(a) U.S.
In the case of the interdealer market for U.S. Treasury securities, trading volume and price volatility
show weak U-shape patterns. The daily peak appears between 8.30 a.m. and 9 a.m. According to
Fleming [1997], this feature can be attributed to important macroeconomic announcements at
8.30  a.m., as well as the opening of U.S. Treasury futures trading at 8.20 a.m. (NY time) at the
Chicago Board of Trade. The other peak between 2.30 p.m. and 3 p.m. coincides with the closing of
U.S. Treasury futures trading at 3  p.m., although the second peak is less pronounced. A weak
U-shaped pattern can also be observed for the bid-ask spread, but the timings of the two peaks seem to
differ from the timing for trading volume and price volatility.
7
(b) Japan
In the case of the interdealer market for Japanese government securities’ trading volume and price
volatility show clear U-shaped patterns. The first peak appears between 9 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. This
might be primarily influenced by the opening of the bond futures market at the Tokyo Stock Exchange
at 9 a.m. The scheduled release of several macroeconomic announcements at 8.50 a.m. may have
caused the peak as well.
8 The second peak, which coincides with the closing of the futures market, is
4 “Effectively” refers to periods during the day when securities can be actively traded. “Officially” refers to official
opening and closing times.
5 Trading hours include only the main session, and do not include evening or overnight sessions.
6 See the footnote of Graph 1 for the definition and calculation process for price volatility, which differs from study to
study.
7 Although both trading volume and bid-ask spread show U-shaped patterns, the correlation coefficient is negative, i.e.,
when trading volume is large, the bid-ask spread tends to be tighter (Fleming [1997]). This may be because of a large
spread in the very early morning and late evening when trading is thin.
8 These announcements include the Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) and the Money Supply,
both of which are generally considered influential by market participants.5
almost as high as the first peak. After the futures market closes, trading volume and price volatility
noticeably decline, even though the cash market officially closes at 5 p.m. A clear U-shaped pattern
can be observed in the bid-ask spread of the futures market for Japanese government securities.
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(c) U.K.
Trading volume in the customer market for U.K. gilts displays a clear U-shaped pattern. The two
peaks appear between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., and between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. According to Proudman
[1995], this pattern may be a result of the release of public news being concentrated at certain times
during the day. Proudman describes major economic news items are released in the U.K. in the early
morning, while U.S. announcements are released in the afternoon, U.K. time. Bid-ask spread also
shows a U-shaped pattern, although the pattern is not as pronounced.
(d) Italy
In the interdealer market for Italian BTPs, both trading volume and price volatility show clear
U-shaped patterns. The first peak in trading volume appears between 9.30 a.m. to 10 a.m., 30 minutes
after the market officially opens. The second peak in trading volume appears around 2.30–4.30 p.m.
Price volatility clearly peaks twice just after the opening and just before the closing of the market. The
bid-ask spread also shows a clear U-shaped pattern with peaks appearing just after the opening and
before the closing of the market. In addition, there another peak appears between 1 and 1.30 p.m.
3.1.2 Stylised facts
It seems that all three parameters (trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread) tend to follow
U-shaped patterns in all markets. Note that the three parameters are often regarded as measures of
market liquidity. It is generally understood that a market is more liquid when trading volume is high,
and price volatility and the bid-ask spread are low. In this sense, the U-shaped patterns may indicate
something about the intraday patterns of liquidity conditions in government securities markets.
One might explain the U-shaped pattern of trading volume in the following way. The high trading
activity just after the opening of the session may be a product of a concentration of trading needs
based on public information which has accumulated since the previous day’s market closing. Also,
high trading activity just before the closing of the session may stem from trading needs to avoid
overnight price risk. The U-shaped pattern of price volatility may result from the positive relationship
between trading volume and price volatility. Fleming [1997] attributes the positive volume-volatility
relationship to new information or opinions being incorporated in prices through trading.
The U-shaped pattern of bid-ask spread requires more careful examination. One may simply argue that
market makers tend to widen the spread when volatility is high, in order to reduce inventory risk.
However, one could also point out that the large trading volume at the peaks of the U-shape may
decrease the cost needed to rebalance market makers’ inventory. Another hypothesis is proposed by
Brock and Kleidon [1992]. They argue that, given a fixed supply of market making capacity over the
short-term, market makers have some market power in the face of increased trading pressure, and they
are thus obtaining higher intermediation margins relative to the true price of assets at the opening and
closing of the trading session. However, as Proudman [1995] points out, it is unclear why the supply
of liquidity must be held constant over the course of the day. At this moment, no theory can clearly
explain the reasons for the shape.
Japan’s auction-agency market shows a U-shaped pattern in its bid-ask spread. It is interesting that the
bid-ask spread in an auction agency market, which is the difference between the best-bid price and the
best-ask price in the order book, also follows a similar pattern to that of dealer markets. While most
9 The bid-ask spread patterns are for the futures market, because data for bid-ask prices from the cash market is
unavailable. The cash and futures markets have similar characteristics, both being auction-agency markets.6
studies focus on dealer markets such as the one by Brock and Kleidon [1992], relatively small number
of studies seem to tackle issues in auction-agency market.
3.1.3 Comparison to equities and forex markets
It seems that most individual research confirms that patterns in the equities market are similar to those
in the government securities market. However, patterns in the forex market are considerably different
from those in the government securities market.
In the U.S. equities market, existing research shows that trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask
spread generally follow a U-shape (Jain and Joh [1988], McInish and Wood [1992], Brock and
Kleidon [1992], and Wood, McInish, and Ord [1985]). Muranaga [1998] finds that the Japanese
equities market shows a similar pattern to that of the U.S.
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Forex markets have different characteristics from the equities and government securities market,
because the forex market is in effect operating 24 hours a day. Andersen and Bollerslev [1998] find
that, in the USD-DM market, although volatility increases in the morning for the main regional
segments (Asia, Europe, New York), there is no direct evidence that this enhanced volatility is related
to the termination of regional trading. This may be because traders can easily close their position
easily at any time.
In sum, government securities markets behave more like equity markets than like the round-the-clock
foreign exchange markets, as their U-shaped patterns for trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask
spread are similar to patterns found in equity markets, but not in forex markets (Fleming [1997]).
3.2 Intraweek patterns
The PD process for intraweek patterns, i.e., patterns according to the day of the week, is another
interesting issue for investigation. While it is impossible to trade on Saturdays and Sundays, public
and private information, which affects the value of a product, is continuously generated. In this sense,
market participants are exposed to price risk on weekends. In addition, especially in the equities
market, participants are also exposed to information asymmetry caused by the accumulation of private
information on weekends. As a result, trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread show
distinct intraweek patterns.
3.2.1 Observed features in government securities markets (see Graph 2)
(a) U.S.
Trading volume is lowest on Mondays and Fridays, and highest on Wednesdays, which creates a clear
“inverse U-shape”.
(b) Japan
Trading volume is lowest on Mondays and highest on Wednesdays, also generally creating an inverse
U-shape. Price volatility forms a similar pattern, although Friday’s volatility is somewhat high.
(c) U.K.
Trading volume is lowest on Mondays and Fridays, and highest on Wednesdays, which creates a clear
inverse U-shape. Bid-ask spread also generally shows an inverse U-shape pattern.
10 The Canadian market also shows a similar U-shaped pattern for the Toronto Stock Exchange (McInish and Wood
[1990]).7
(d) Italy
Scalia [1997b] shows there is no evidence of intraweek effects for the behaviour of trading volume.
3.2.2 Stylised facts
Judging from the intraweek patterns for government securities markets in the U.S., Japan and the
U.K., trading volume appears to be largest on Wednesdays, compared to that of Mondays and Fridays,
which creates an inverse U-shape pattern. How can this inverse U-shape be explained?
The first hypothesis proposes that volume is low on Mondays and high on Wednesdays because
market participants need a day or two to digest information, in order to evaluate and execute
short-term investment strategies for the week. However, it is unclear why so much time is needed to
digest information.
The second hypothesis proposes that public information such as macroeconomic announcements and
decision making meetings by central banks is released in bunches on certain days of the week.
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Presumably, the number of such releases is large on Wednesdays and small on Mondays and Fridays.
However, Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999] and Mitchell and Mulherin [1994] show that this
hypothesis does not seem to apply to the Japanese or U.S. market, because the number of
announcements are relatively large on Fridays and small on Wednesdays.
12 Of course, one may
propose a hypothesis that important announcements concentrate on Fridays, but such a hypothesis has
not been examined.
The third hypothesis emphasises the possibility that the number of market participants is smaller on
Mondays and Fridays. This is partly explained by the time differences, i.e., the New York market is
still closed on Mondays in Tokyo time, and the Tokyo market is already closed when the New York
market opens on Friday. However, while this argument may partly explain Tokyo’s low volume on
Mondays and New York’s low volume on Fridays, it is unclear why the trading volume is relatively
low on Fridays in Tokyo and apparently low on Mondays in New York. One can also argue that partly
due to the larger number of meetings on Mondays and Fridays, planning and summarising weekly
trading strategy, there are less effective market participants on those days. However, no empirical
evidence has supported this argument.
In sum, for the moment, there are no definite answers for the intraweek patterns, leaving the door open
for future study.
3.2.3 Comparison to equities and forex markets
13
While there are many individual studies of each equities market, a cross country comparison may be
better achieved by using the same methodology across markets. In this regard, let us conduct a simple
analysis of the intraweek patterns for trading volume and price volatility in the equities markets
(Graph 3).
11 For example, the Councils for the Deutsche Bundesbank and Banque de France are held on Thursdays.
12 Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999] check the composition ratio for the Japanese market by the day of the week of the
release dates for 14 major statistics from July 1996 to August 1997. Among the 176 releases, 28 (15.9%) are on Monday,
33 (18.8%) on Tuesday, 21 (11.9%) on Wednesday, 31 (17.6% ) on Thursday, and 63 (35.8%) on Friday. Mitchell and
Mulherin [1994] check the composition ratio for the U.S. market for 17 major statistics from 1983 to 1990. Of the 1,619
releases, 185 (11.4%) are on Monday, 321 (19.8%) on Tuesday, 327 (20.2%) on Wednesday, 255 (15.8% ) on Thursday,
and 531 (32.8%) on Friday. These results do not seem to explain the low trading volume on Mondays and Fridays, or
high trading volume on Wednesdays.
13 At the moment, existing studies on forex markets seem to be limited. One of the few empirical analyses is by Andersen
and Bollerslev [1998]. They find that, while volatility is low on Mondays and high on Thursdays and Fridays in the
USD-DM market, the pattern is insignificant after controlling the intraweek pattern of statistical announcements.8
At first glance, trading volume seems to follow a similar inverse U-shaped pattern.
14 However, there
seem to be subtle differences between the government securities and equities markets. Trading volume
is lowest on Mondays and increases on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, as with government securities
markets. However, with the exception of the U.K., trading volume on Fridays does not decline so
much, when compared with patterns of government securities markets. In fact, in Japan, trading
volume is largest on Fridays. Price volatility follows somewhat different patterns. While it is also
generally high on Fridays with the exception of Italy, it not lowest on Mondays.
These differences may imply different PD processes between government securities market and
equities markets. Trading volume patterns can be partly explained by the hypothesis which states that
the degree of information asymmetry is presumed to be highest on Mondays and lowest on Fridays.
Foster and Viswanathan [1990] point out that liquidity traders have an incentive to delay trading when
they perceive a high degree of information asymmetry. They argue that, if private information
accumulates over the weekend without a corresponding flow of public news announcements, trading
volume tends to be smaller on Mondays and larger on Fridays, as inside information loses value as
time passes. Along the same lines of this hypothesis, apparently liquidity traders also have an
incentive to close their positions before the weekend to protect themselves from the accumulation of
private information. Such behaviour by liquidity traders would then lead to increased trading volume
on Fridays.
While high price volatility on Fridays may very well be associated with relatively large trading
volume on Fridays, price volatility is relatively high on Mondays although trading volume is low on
Mondays. This feature may be explained by a hypothesis which proposes that the majority of traders
are likely to be informed traders on Mondays, as discussed above. It may be that market prices tend to
be volatile because of the lack of liquidity traders who provide liquidity to the market.
4. PD process after the arrival of public information
It may be safe to say that government securities trading is primarily driven by the arrival of public
information, contrary to equities trading where private information plays a vital role. However, not all
public information affects the PD process of government securities. In this sense, it may be worth
examining the PD process surrounding the arrival of influential public information, focusing on the
behaviour of trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spreads. Let us explore the effect of
statistical announcements, notification of open market operations, and releases of policy rate changes.
4.1 Statistical announcements
Indeed, statistical announcements do seem to greatly influence the PD process. As discovered in
Fleming and Remolona [1997b], the largest price movements and greatest surges in trading activity
are mostly associated with recently released announcements. Fleming and Remolona [1997a] note that
trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spreads surge in the U.S. Treasury market on days when
announcements are made (Graph 4). Also, by taking a closer look, they identified that these
parameters take on “five stylised facts” (see Graph 5 for the actual behaviour of these parameters),
which are summarised as follows.
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14 The inverse U-shaped pattern has been identified in numerous studies. Among them, Mitchell and Mulherin [1994]
attribute the shape to the pattern in the volume of information. According to them, the intraweek patterns in trading
volume are related to the pattern in the number of news releases by Dow and Jones & Company by the day of the week:
19.6% on Monday, 20.3% on Tuesday, 20.2% on Wednesday, 21.2% on Thursday, and 18.7% on Fridays.
15 In the newer version of the paper (Fleming and Remolona [1998]), they analyse the adjustment process from different
framework.9
First, the most volatile prices occur upon announcements, at which time there is a notably low trading
volume. Second, bid-ask spreads widen with volatility spikes, incurred by dealers’ behaviour to
control inventory risks, and narrow with surges in trading volume a few minutes later, as surges in
trading volume reduce the uncertainty in transaction flows. Third, volume surges come only after lags,
suggesting disagreement among dealers regarding initial price adjustments. This is because the precise
magnitude of the appropriate price change is a matter for interpretation, which differs among dealers.
Fourth, high price volatility and high trading volume continue for extended periods, implying a
sluggish process in market participants’ reconciling heterogeneous views. Finally, high volume
persists for longer than high volatility, which probably reflects the behaviour of liquidity traders who
employ investment strategies such as duration targeting and dynamic hedging. They react to price
changes after optimal reaction lags caused by transactions costs.
Fleming and Remolona [1997b] test the surprise effect of announcements, which is defined as the
difference between the forecast number and the actual number. This is based on the assumption that
information may be valuable to the extent that it is unexpected. In general, it is shown that greater
surprises cause greater rises/falls in price and greater surges in trading volume, although the effect is
less evident in trading volume. They also test whether surges in price volatility and trading volume are
larger under conditions of increased uncertainty, as measured by implied volatility from Treasury
futures options. As a result, price responses to given announcement surprises are frequently greater
under large uncertainty. For trading activity, market uncertainty often heightens the trading surges that
follow announcement surprises.
While this kind of detailed analysis is limited to the U.S. market for the moment, increased trading
volume is also associated with statistical announcements in the U.K. market as well. Proudman [1995]
attributes the concentration of trading volume at certain times of the day to macroeconomic
announcements in the U.K. in the early morning and in the U.S. in the afternoon in U.K. time.
Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999] explore patterns for intraday trading volume and price volatility in
the Japanese market on days when major statistics are released and those when they are not. They
found that both trading volume and price volatility are greater on days when statistics are released
(Graph 4). It is also confirmed the finding of Fleming and Remolona [1997a] that trading volume
around announcements surges with a lag after volatility spikes, and continue longer than volatility
(Graph 5).
Scalia [1997b] shows that, in the Italian market, while there is no empirical proof of higher trading
volume after 2.30 p.m. on U.S. announcement days versus non-announcement days, there is evidence
that bid-ask spread widens one hour before the release of U.S. monthly indicators at 2.30 p.m. Italian
time, rising up to 4-6 basis points (Graph 4). This finding that the bid-ask spread begins to widen just
before announcement, seems to coincide with findings of Fleming and Remolona [1997a].
4.2 Notification of open market operations
Notification of open market operations (OMOs) have two implications in terms of new PD in
government securities markets. First, OMOs can contain some information on central bank’s monetary
policies, which could eventually lead to changes in securities prices. Second, as large buy/sell orders,
OMOs affect supply-demand conditions for securities in the private sector to be purchased/sold, which
could also influence the values of securities. These characteristics are what market participants cannot
find in private transactions.
In this regard, Inoue [1999] examines the immediate effects of OMO notification by the Bank of Japan
on trading volume and price volatility in the government securities market. His findings are as follows.
First, only outright OMOs by the BOJ affect trading volume and price volatility. This means that
market participants seem to react when public information contains some information on monetary
policy and this has a long-term effect on supply-demand conditions in the securities market. In this
sense, the information content of notifications seems important in the PD process. Second, changes in
the purchase amounts and notification times of OMOs increase the spikes, suggesting that the level of
predictability of OMO notification seems to affect smoothness of the price discovery process, i.e., the10
lower/higher the predictability, the higher/lower the spikes. This may imply that a central bank should
conduct its OMOs in a predictable manner when it simply wishes to provide liquidity to the market.
This may also imply that a central bank could possibly send a policy signal to the market by notifying
an OMO in an unexpected manner, if market participants perceive the notification as a signal of policy
change.
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In the U.S. market, Fleming [1997] discovers that there is little evidence that activity picks up during
the Federal Reserve’s customary intervention time (then 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m.), but price volatility
seems to jump slightly during periods of Fed intervention.
4.3 Announcement of policy rate changes
Central banks’ announcements of policy rate changes may be worth investigating. Although such
policy rates are usually short-term interest rates, the changes likely affect future expectations for
long-term interest rates. In this sense, the announcement may contain important public information
affecting the value of government securities.
However, since policy rates changes usually do not occur so often, an event study may be the
appropriate approach. In this regard, let us examine the behaviour of trading volume, price volatility,
and bid-ask spread of JGB futures contract traded on the LIFFE, around the September 9, 1998
announcement that the Bank of Japan lowered its policy rate (overnight call rate) from “just below
0.5%” to “0.25%” (Graph 6). Such examination reveals that trading volume, price volatility, and
bid-ask spread show notable increases immediately after the announcement.
4.4 Stylised facts
The features observed above can be stylised as follows. First, the arrival of public information is
surely a primary factor in a new PD process. During the process, trading volume, price volatility, and
bid-ask spread show a distinct pattern. It seems that bid-ask spreads tend to widen just before the
arrival of public information. Trading volume may persist longer than price volatility, because of
liquidity traders who rebalance their portfolios after new equilibrium prices are discovered. Market
makers’ behaviour to control their inventory risk seemingly plays an important role in the PD process.
Second, the information content of such announcements/notification is important. Not all
announcements of statistics have the same impact. In Fleming and Remolona [1997b], several
statistics such as employment data are identified as systematically having larger effect on prices. Not
all OMO notification has the same impact. In Japan, only outright OMOs by the BOJ seem to
immediately affect the PD process. In this sense, how market participants perceive incoming public
information affects the PD process.
Third, the surprise element of an announcement is crucial in the PD process. The larger the surprise,
the larger the surges in trading volume and price volatility.
5. Interlinkage of the cash and futures markets
Interlinkage of the cash and futures markets has interesting implications on the liquidity of
government securities markets. In some cases, these markets can be complementary, i.e., a liquid cash
market is partly the product of a well-developed futures market and vice versa. In the Japanese
government securities market, a relatively liquid 10-year cash market might be the cause of a liquid
16 It seems that sometimes the U.S. also changes the notification time of OMOs in response to the changing market
environment, which market participants may perceive as a sign of possible change in the Fed’s policy.11
10-year futures market. In other cases, these markets can be substitutive. In the U.S. Treasury market,
the cash market is more active for 5 and 10-year maturities, but the futures market is more active for
30-year maturities. This example identified by Fleming and Sarkar [1998] may show that these
markets are substitutive.
In this regard, the interlinkage of price discovery between markets is an appropriate topic to
investigate. There are various approaches to deal with this issue. However, partly due to the
availability of data, this paper will analyse the relative speed of PD to incorporate new information.
5.1 Observed features
It seems that existing studies have adopted two approaches to this issue. The first approach, used by
several studies, uses an error correction model by Garbade and Silber [1983]. This model shows how
often each market incorporates new information more rapidly on a percentage basis. The second
approach, taken by Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999], conducts a simple time-series regression
analysis.
Taking the first approach, Holland and Vila [1998] discover that, in the U.K., French, German, and
Italian government securities markets, futures markets respond to new information faster than cash
markets respond over 90% of the time.
17 In the Canadian market, Harvey [1996] finds that between
1993 to 1995, the BAX (futures for bankers’ acceptances) market responded to new information faster
than the treasury bill market 71% of the time.
Taking the second approach reveals that, in the Japanese government securities market, the price
movement of the cash market lag 1–2 minutes behind that of the futures market. However, in the U.S.
market, there is no lag for price movements in cash 5 and 10-year T-notes, but the price movements in
30-year cash T-bonds lag one minute behind those for T-bond futures contracts (Miyanoya, Inoue and
Higo [1999]). This may be because cash transactions are generally heavier in 5 and 10-year segments,
while futures transactions are heavier in 30-year segments (Fleming and Sarkar [1998]). This may
imply the speed of PD increases when a market is liquid.
5.2 Stylised facts
Considering these discovered facts, it may be stylised that futures prices lead cash prices. Several
factors have been identified as possible reasons. Holland and Vila [1998] focus on the accessibility of
the market, arguing that initial capital outlays are smaller in the futures market than in the spot market,
while investors’ access to capital may be limited. Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999] argue that, in
Japan, different order-processing mechanisms (cash – telephone, futures – electronic) may favour
faster PD in the futures market.
18
17 For the Italian market, Scalia [1997a] reveals that futures prices lead cash prices by between 15 and 30 minutes. For the
French government securities market, Bensaid and Boutillier [1998] show that, while futures prices generally lead in
stable financial conditions, but the speed of PD differs depending on the importance of information, i.e., important
information is simultaneously assimilated, but less important information is first processed in the futures markets.
18 In Japan, the different transaction tax treatment between cash and futures markets may also contribute to the faster PD in
the futures market (Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999]).12
6. Conclusion
6.1 Summary of the findings and implications
Throughout this comparative study, the following stylised facts and possible implications are
identified. First, on an intraday basis, trading volume, price volatility, and bid-ask spread show
U-shaped patterns in government securities markets. However, on an intraweek basis, these three
parameters show inverse U-shaped patterns in government securities markets. Meanwhile, equities and
forex markets show different intraday and/or intraweek patterns, indicating different PD processes
apply to different products.
Second, the arrival of public information such as statistical announcements, notification of OMOs, and
releases of policy rate changes affects the PD process, creating surges in trading volume, price
volatility, and bid-ask spread. The information content of an announcement/notification affects the
degree of new PD. Also, in the PD process, the surprise element is important, i.e., the greater the
surprise, the greater the surges in trading volume and price volatility. In this regard, it may be
concluded that a central bank should notify an OMO or announce statistics and policy rate changes in
a predictable manner when it wishes to mitigate the impact on trading volume and price volatility. On
the other hand, a central bank may be able to send policy signals by making notifications or
announcements in an unexpected manner.
Third, the speed of PD is generally faster in futures markets than in cash markets, partly reflecting
higher accessibility and faster order-processing in the futures markets. This faster speed of PD may
indicate that futures markets are deeper and more liquid than cash markets, in the sense that they
quickly reflect incoming information, which gives them a high information content.
6.2 Areas for future study
While several stylised facts are identified in this paper, some areas for future study do remain. First, it
may be worthwhile to examine the theoretical framework that applies to each market (government
securities, equities, and forex) focusing on the role of information. This is because most prior efforts
have concentrated on equities markets, where asymmetric information dominates. Such an endeavour
to investigate the theoretical framework would shed light on the different PD processes, explaining
differences between U-shaped intraday patterns and inverse U-shaped intraweek patterns in
government securities markets, as well as what causes different intraday and intraweek patterns among
government securities, equities, and forex markets. Ultimately, what determines market liquidity for
each market (government securities, equities, and forex) is expected to be identified, taking account of
the different nature of each product.
Second, another interesting area may be the interlinkage among various financial markets. Mainly due
to limited data, this paper only addressed the relative speed of PD between cash and futures markets
for government securities. However, the interlinkage of the two markets should have various
dimensions. For example, these markets can be complementary as well as substitutive, as discussed in
Section 5. In addition, one cannot discuss the market liquidity of government securities markets in
isolation from other markets. It is carefully worth investigating the relationship between the cash and
repo markets, or the relationship between the government securities and other fixed income securities
markets.
Third, a round-the-clock PD process is also intriguing.
19 As financial activities become more globalise,
financial products would be traded even more in foreign markets. However, judging from the
19 Studies of this topic are currently being conducted almost exclusively for the U.S. market, and thus it may not be possible
to draw stylised facts across countries. See Appendix for preliminary analysis.13
availability of data and the number of existing studies, central banks may not have sufficient
knowledge on how prices are discovered outside the domestic market. By increasing understanding of
the similarities and differences in the PD process outside the home market, a central bank may gain
better insight of the functioning of the financial market.14
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Appendix
A round-the-clock price discovery of government securities
Although most government securities trading is concentrated in the domestic market, trading also
occurs in foreign markets. While the availability of data is limited for trading outside the domestic
market, some studies do focus on the “a round-the-clock PD process”.
Fleming [1997] provides a framework that tests the degree of PD on a global scale. He investigates the
predictability of opening prices for U.S. Treasury securities for a certain day in the New York market
by regressing the closing prices for the same day in the Tokyo and London markets. He concludes that
closing prices in Tokyo and London are unbiased predictors of overnight price changes in the New
York market. This finding imply that, while the trading volume in foreign markets is relatively small,
government securities prices are well discovered round-the-clock.
Fleming and Lopez [1998] present another framework which examines the possible spillover of
intraday price volatility among the three trading centres (New York, Tokyo, and London) for U.S.
Treasury securities. They conclude that “(Price) volatility in Tokyo and London is best characterised
by the meteor shower hypothesis, with volatility spilling into these markets from the other trading
centres. In contrast, we find that volatility in New York is best characterised by the heat wave
hypothesis, as little evidence is found that volatility spills into New York from the other trading
centres. The absence of meteor showers in New York may be explained by differences in information
arrival from the other trading centres. Information arrival in the U.S. Treasury market is highly
concentrated during New York trading hours. Spillovers from New York into the overseas trading
centres therefore seem more likely to occur and easier to detect than spillovers from the overseas
trading centres into New York”. This finding is consistent with the findings of other studies that
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Intraday Patterns of Trading Volume in Government Securities Markets
<common to all panels>
Notes: The bars show composition ratios for each 30-minute (1-hour in U.K.) segment for daily
trading volume.
<U.S.>
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes: The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows trading volume for each 5-
minute segment.  The panel shows interdealer trading volume for the benchmark 5-year
Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to August 19, 1994.
<Japan>
Source: Inoue [1999]
Notes: The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows trading volume for each 5-
minute segment.  The panel shows interdealer trading volume for the benchmark 10-year
Japanese government security from July 1996 to June 1998.
<U.K.>
Source: Proudman [1995]
Notes: The panel shows customer trading volume for three issues (6% Treasury stock 1999, 9.5%
Treasury stock 2005, and 2.5% Treasury stock 2016 <index-linked>) from October 1993 to
October 1994.
<Italy>
Source: Scalia and Vacca [1998]
Notes: The panel shows total interdealer trading volume from July 14, 1997 to the end of May 1998.21
Intraday Patterns of Price Volatility in Government Securities Markets
<common to all panels>
Notes: The bars show price volatility for each 30-minute segment.
<U.S.>
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes: The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows price volatility for each 5-
minute segment.  The panel shows the standard deviation of log price changes.  The data are
for interdealer trading for the benchmark 5-year Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to
August 19, 1994.  The standard deviation equals the actual standard deviation times 1,000.
<Japan>
Source: Inoue [1999]
Notes: The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows price volatility for each 5-
minute segment gauged every minute.  The panel shows the standard deviation of yield
changes.  The data are for interdealer trading for the benchmark 10-year Japanese government
security from July 1996 to June 1998.  The standard deviation equals the actual standard
deviation times 1,000.
<Italy>
Source: Scalia and Vacca [1998]
Notes: The panel shows the squared log price difference in 30-minute intervals.  The data are for
interdealer trading for the benchmark 10-year BTP from July 14, 1997 to the end of May
1998.22
Intraday Patterns of Bid-ask Spread in Government Securities Markets
<common to all panels>
Notes: The bars show the bid-ask spread for each 30-minute (1-hour in U.K.) segment.
<U.S.>
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes: The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows spreads for each 5-minute
segment.  The panel shows the average spread in the interdealer trading for the benchmark 5-
year Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to August 19, 1994.  The spread is measured in
hundredths of a percent.
<Japan>
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: The panel shows the average spread measured in 5-second intervals on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.  The data are for the most active futures contract for 10-year Japanese government
securities from December 1, 1997 to February 5, 1998.  The spread is measured in ten
thousandths of the notional face value.
<U.K.>
Source: Proudman [1995]
Notes: The panel shows the average realized spread estimated by the model developed by Roll
[1984] .  The data are for customer trading for three issues (6% Treasury stock 1999, 9.5%
Treasury stock 2005, and 2.5% Treasury stock 2016 <index-linked>) from October 1993 to
October 1994.  The spread is measured by percentages of price.
<Italy>
Source: Scalia and Vacca [1998]
Notes: The panel shows the average spread estimated by the model developed by Foster and
Viswanathan [1993]. The data are for interdealer trading for the benchmark 10-year BTP from






<Italy> - no intraweek pattern exists.
See the last page of Graph 2 for sources and notes.


































<Italy> - no intraweek pattern exists.
See the last page of Graph 2 for sources and notes.












<Italy> - no intraweek pattern exists.
See the last page of Graph 2 for sources and notes.








mon tue wed thu fri26
Intraweek Patterns of Trading Volume in Government Securities Markets
<common to all panels>
Notes: The bars show the composition ratios for each day of the week for weekly trading volume.
<U.S.>
Source: Data provided by Fleming
Notes: The panel shows interdealer trading volume for the benchmark 5-year Treasury note from
April 4 to August 19, 1994.
<Japan>
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: The panel shows interdealer trading volume for the benchmark 10-year Japanese government
security from July 1996 to June 1998.
<U.K.>
Source: Proudman [1995]
Notes: The panel shows customer trading volume for three issues (6% Treasury stock 1999, 9.5%
Treasury stock 2005, and 2.5% Treasury stock 2016 <index-linked>) from October 1993 to
October 1994.
Intraweek Patterns of Price Volatility in Government Securities Markets
<Japan>
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: The panel shows the standard deviation of yield changes for each 5-minute segment, gauged
every minute.  The data are for interdealer trading for the benchmark 10-year Japanese
government security from July 1996 to June 1998.  The standard deviation equals the actual
standard deviation times 1,000.
Intraweek Patterns of Bid-ask Spread in Government Securities Markets
<U.K.>
Source: Proudman [1995]
Notes: The panel shows the average realized spread estimated by the model developed by Roll
[1984]. The data are for customer trading for three issues (6% Treasury stock 1999, 9.5%
Treasury stock 2005, and 2.5% Treasury stock 2016 <index-linked>) from October 1993 to
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Intraweek Patterns of Trading Volume in Equities Markets
<common to all panels>
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: The bars show composition ratios for each day of the week for weekly trading volume.  The
sample period is from October 1996 to September 1998.  Days when Special Quotations are
calculated for futures contracts are excluded.  These days are the third Friday in U.S., U.K.
and Italy, and the second Friday in Japan, in March, June, September, and December.
<U.S.>
Notes: The panel shows trading volume in the New York Stock Exchange.
<Japan>
Notes: The panel shows trading volume in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
<U.K.>
Notes: The panel shows trading volume in the London Stock Exchange.
<Italy>
Notes: The panel shows trading volume in the Milan Stock Exchange.
Intraweek Patterns of Price Volatility in Equities Markets
<common to all panels>
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: The bars show composition ratios of price volatility for each day of the week.  The price
volatility is measured by the intraday price change (daily high minus daily low).  The sample
period is from October 1996 to September 1998.  Days when Special Quotations are
calculated for futures contracts are excluded, as above.
<U.S.>
Notes: The panel shows price volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the New York Stock
Exchange.
<Japan>
Notes: The panel shows price volatility of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average in the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.
<U.K.>
Notes: The panel shows price volatility of the FTSE 100 Index in the London Stock Exchange.
<Italy>
Notes: The panel shows price volatility of the Milan MIB Telematico Index in the Milan Stock
Exchange.30
Graph 4
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes:
Source: Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999]
Notes: The panel shows interdealer trading volume for the benchmark 10-year
Japanese government security from July 1996 to August 1997.
Announcement days are those days when at least one of 14 important
announcements are made.
Effect of Announcements on Intraday Patterns of Trading Volume
<U.S.>
<Japan>
The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows trading
volume for each 5-minute segment. The panel shows interdealer trading
volume for the benchmark 5-year Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to
August 19, 1994. Announcement days are those days when at least one of
















announcement day non-announcement day31
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes:
Source: Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo [1999]
Notes:
Effect of Announcements on Intraday Patterns of Price Volatility
<Japan>
<U.S.>
The author simplified the original chart in the source which shows price
volatility for each 5-minute segment. The panel shows the standard
deviation of log price changes. The data are for interdealer trading for the
benchmark 5-year Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to August 19,
1994. The standard deviation equals actual standard deviation times
1,000. Announcement days are those days when at least one of 19
important announcements are made
The panel shows the standard deviation of yield changes. The data are for
interdealer trading for the benchmark 10-year Japanese government
security from July 1996 to June 1998. The standard deviation equals the
actual standard deviation times 1,000. Announcement days are those days


















announcement day non-announcement day32
Source: Fleming and Remolona [1997a]
Notes:
Source: Scalia [1997b]
Notes: The panel shows estimated spread in interdealer trading for benchmark 10-
year bonds (BTPs) from January to June, 1993. The spread is measured
as a percentage of bond prices. Announcement days are those days when
U.S. macroeconomic announcements are made at 14:30 Italian time (8:30
NY time).  Separate data are not available after 14:30.
Effect of Announcements on Intraday Patterns of Bid-ask Spread
<U.S.>
<Italy>
The panel shows average spread in interdealer trading for the benchmark
5-year Treasury note from August 23, 1993 to August 19, 1994. The
spread is measured in hundredth of one percent. Announcement days are
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Graph 5
announcements
<U.S.>      Source:
     Notes:
<Japan> Source:
Notes:




The graph shows trading volume and price volatility at around 8:50 when 5 statistics
including Tankan and money supply are released. The sample period is from July 1, 1996
to August 29, 1997. Trading volume is the 5-minute average volume of benchmark 10-
year bonds through the largest interdealer broker. Price volatility is the standard deviation
of log yield changes for the same issue.
The graph shows mean trading volume (tens of millions U.S. dollars), standard deviation
of log price changes (actual standard deviation times 1,000), and mean bid-ask spread (ten
thousandth of face value) for announcement days for the on-the-run 5-year Treasury note.
Announcement days are defined as days with at least one of the following announcements:
Consumer Price Index, Employment, Producer Price Index, all of whish are announced at
8:30 a.m. The sample period is from August 23, 1993 to August 19, 1994 (250 trading
days). The times shown are interval starting times. The upper panel shows the data for
each 1-minute segment, and the lower panel shows each 5-minute segment before 8:45 and
15-minute segment after 9:00.
Author’s calculation.






























Trading volume (left, 100 mil. yen) Price volatility (right, %)34
Graph 6
  Source: Author’s calculations.
  Notes: The graph shows trading volume (billion yen), standard deviation of price changes (actual
standard deviation times 1,000), and mean bid-ask spread (one-ten-thousandthof notional
face value) for the 10-year futures contract on Japanese government bonds traded on the
LIFFE. ThedataareforSeptember9,1998,whentheBankofJapanannouncedthatit would
cut its policy rate. At 6:06 p.m. (Tokyo time), the Bank of Japan revealed that it would
announcetheresultsofitsPolicyBoardMeetingat6:15p.m. At 6:15,the Bank’sdecisionto
lower the policy rate was posted on information vendor screens. At 6:16, details of the
change, i.e., to lower its policy target rate (overnight call rate) from "just below 0.5%" to
"0.25%",waspostedon the screens. The timesshownare intervalstartingtimes. The upper
panel shows data for each 1-minute segment, and the lower panel shows each 5-minute
segment, converted to a per-minute basis.
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